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Proposition 209 
 
Abstract: 
 The question posed is whether proposition 209 unconstitutionally bars a remedy to 
discrimination against a specified group "women and minorities", and thereby denies equal 
protection of the laws to a targeted group. The partial template for this problem is provided by 
the Supreme Courts disposition of Romer v. Evans. 
 The conclusion of my analysis here is that it does not. My analysis relies on two theories, 
one formal and one political. The formal proposition is this: a remedy is only meaningful as a 
response to an injury. In equal protection and discrimination jurisprudence, the Federal courts 
have imposed, and the Supreme Court has upheld, quotas, busing, and other affirmative 
measures against discrimination where there has been a judicial finding of past discrimination. 
There has been no such finding against the University of California or any of the contracting 
agencies of the state of California. Further, each time such a remedy to a demonstrated injury 
has been imposed, the Court has demanded that the remedy conform to a tight fit to the 
demonstrated injury. No injury has been demonstrated here, therefore no remedy exists, and to 
quote Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch vs. Maryland "what does not exist can not be taken 
away." 
 The second theoretical strategy relies on the Courts decisions in cases like Miller v. 
Schoene and Williamson v. Lee Optical, post substantive due process cases where a non-neutral 
re-distribution of rights or property was scrutinized in light of the relative political participation of 
the parties in the dispute. The crucial issue here is whether the constituencies impacted by such 
a redistribution are properly represented by the state agencies of authority. An analysis of this 
sort leads naturally to an examination of the "political structure" question raised by the three-
judge panel of the Ninth Circuit. I elaborate upon this line of reasoning and conclude that the 
patchwork arrangement of "special interest deals and bargains" by which the state agencies have 
instituted "affirmative action" shows none of the accountability to representative constituencies 
demanded when the act is not a remedy to discrimination but is simply a redistribution of 
resources from one interest group to another. 
  
  
  
  
  
Proposition 209 and the Public Consensus 
  
An examination of the constitutionality of an amendment to the California constitution by an 
examination of the representation of constituencies in the political process.  
   
[This is an incomplete analysis which requires more empirical study]  
  
Matthew Hartogh 
Constitutional Law 
Spring 1997 
  
Introduction  
  
  
 When I initially staked out a position in support of proposition 209, my opening defense 
was going to be on the order of "4,736,180 voters cant all be stupid". But in light of the effects 
of proposition 13, it isnt at all clear that a referendum passed by the electorate must be rational, 
or even constitutionally viable. The Supreme Court puts more weight on the latter condition and 
less on the former. "Rational" or not, the Court often errs on the side of granting deference to 
the will of the people, as expressed in the political process. Yet the Court has never abdicated its 
duty to adjudicate cases and controversies which come before it with important constitutional 
questions. In this modern era of the regulatory state, in this era in which the bright-line spheres 
of rights and powers characteristic of substantive due process are always blurred, the Courts role 
as the arbiter of disputes among competing agents in our society is more important than ever. 
  
  
Setting the Stage for Affirmative Action.  
   
 No where has the modern problem of the regulatory state been put into higher relief 
than with the problem of affirmative action. Following on the heels of Brown v. Board of 
Education, the political and judicial process of this country has been put to the service of 
establishing civil rights for African Americans and similarly disadvantaged groups. The tone was 
set by Justice Stones footnote 4 in United States v.Carolene Products 
in which he asserted that legislation which impacted upon groups which would later be called 
"discrete and insular" should be reviewed under a heightened judicial standard. The prototype for 
this heightened judicial review was the distinction the Court had historically made between cases 
of "direct" and "indirect" classifications made by regulatory legislation which was reviewed under 
commerce clause jurisprudence. 
 After Brown, however, although legislative milestones like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
were being deployed on the national level, the progress in desegregating schools and public 
accommodations on the local level was frustratingly slow. The Federal Judiciary was forced to 
take an activist position to insure that the mandate of equal rights for all would come to 
  
 pass in our lifetime. Those of us who lived through the 1960s remember the crusading judges, 
pen and national guard in hand, who forcibly desegregated school districts, fire departments, and 
other public agencies from South Carolina to South Boston. 
 Affirmative action was the natural extension of this process. 
Policies legitimately called affirmative action have a long history pre-dating this era of judicial 
activism. Institutions like Columbia Law School 
have practiced outreach to minority candidates who ordinarily would be shut out of an Ivy 
League education. Private foundations and charities have had policies in place for many years 
which sought to elevate the condition of African Americans even while much of white America 
was closed to their access. But it is only with the era of judicial activism in the 1960s and early 
1970s that a major push was made to increase the representation of African Americans in our 
public institutions of higher education and in the larger world of government and corporate 
business. Although with decisions like Sweatt v. Painter, de jure segregation of our professional 
institutions was ended, it would take another 20 years for a serious effort to end segregation in 
fact. 
   
   
 The problems with the various solutions tried by public institutions to effectuate this goal 
are the problems of bureaucracy in general: a general insensitivity to the particular conditions 
which optimally require a remedy tailored for that purpose. A school like Columbia or Harvard has 
the time, the resources, and most important, the limited scope of its mission, to give a process 
like affirmative action the attention it requires. 
When the goal of equality of opportunity must be accomplished on a mass scale by the state, 
corners have to be cut. Yet when the state acts, the bar against nondiscrimination set by the 
14th amendment to the Constitution is much higher. The result is a case like Regents of The 
University of California v. Bakke, in which the Court held that Alan Bakkes constitutional right to 
equal protection had been violated because the university used a system based on a numerical 
quota to admit minority applicants to the medical school at Davis who had a lower composite 
score than Bakke. The court did not deny the University of California the right to use race in its 
admissions decisions, it did not foreclose the possibility of admission criteria which composed a 
composite score which includes race as one of a complex of factors to be considered but (and 
this is important to our assessment of 209) the Court did not require the state to include race.  
  
  
Admissions to the state medical school is an area where the Court, in the 
 absence of a judicial finding of systematic discrimination, grants discretion to the state to 
determine what subsidies it will provide. 
  
What is Wrong with Proposition 209 ?  
 A major objection to proposition 209 raised by plaintiffs The Council for Economic Equity, 
et. al, is that it dismantles affirmative action and thereby selectively disadvantages a group which 
is underrepresented in the political process. The plaintiffs claim to represent this group which 
they term "women and minorities". The argument used to allege this differential impact is the so-
called "political structure" argument which figures prominently in Hunter v. Erickson(1969) and 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 (1982). 
 In Coalition v. Wilson et al (97-15030), circuit court judges OScannlain, Leavy, and 
Kleinfeld reject the political structure objection to 209 on the grounds that "women and 
minorities" taken as an aggregate constitute a majority of the population (and the electorate) 
and so how can a political bloc be biased against itself. This is a good argument and one 
disanalogy with the Hunter and Seattle cases where the majority electorate was of a different 
racial composition from the impacted individuals. I 
  
would scrutinize this argument further than the district court, however.  Suppose we were to 
drop women from the electoral equation, so that we do not buttress the results of the 
referendum in favor of 209 when it may be the case that women voted in smaller percentages 
than men. Mutatis mutandis we would then have certain "minorities" who would be 
disadvantaged by the action of an electorate which is already over 50% non-anglo-saxon. How 
do you identify the legitimate classes of winners and losers in a case where some "women" and 
some "minorities" may act legislatively to disadvantage other "women and minorities". 
 The problem of identification in my mind is crucial and a relevant citation at this point is 
Romer v. Evans where the issue was a state initiative which invalidated local ordinances which 
prohibited discrimination against gays and lesbians. That initiative was doubly suspect because it 
specifically named a particular class to be denied civil rights protection; and secondly 
it denied remedies for discrimination required under equal protection. 
 Proposition 209 does not explicitly deny remedies for discrimination to any group as 
measure 2 does. Rather, section 31(g) states: 
The remedies available for violations of this section shall be the same, regardless of the injured 
partys race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, as are otherwise available for violations of 
then-existing California antidiscrimination law. 
  
 The question of whether a denial of racial and gender based preferences constitutes a 
denial of equal protection remedies for "women and minorities" is an important one to which I 
will turn now. 
  
Is Preferential Treatment, Per se, a Remedy?  
 Blacks Law Dictionary defines remedy, in relevant part, as: 
The means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed or 
compensated. 
  
 The general term remedy, has a special connotation when viewed in the historical 
context of federal and supreme court adjudication of cases involving a violation of constitutional 
equal protection. Indeed, as professor Tribe points out, the Court is never color blind, and has, 
with some unease, mandated affirmative remedies in the form of set-asides and quotas, but only 
in the case where "egregious" violations have occurred. 
 By contrast, in Regents v. Bakke, the court articulates the doctrine which guides its 
reserve in the assignment of affirmative remedies in the absence of a specific finding of fact of 
systematic discrimination: 
We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively 
victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. 
  
  
My answer to the question is this: without a judicial fact-finding there is no injury. Without an 
injury there can be no remedy. Affirmative action, therefore, aside from the remedies which are 
specifically preserved intact by article 31, is not a remedy and prop 209 cannot deny what does 
not exist. Q.E.D. 
Constituencies in a Democracy  
 A most important question facing us at this point is the legitimate extent of the political 
power wielded by organized blocs, coalitions, and other constituencies in the democratic state. 
The question of how much latitude should be given to the peoples representatives: the 
legislature, state boards with delegated executive power (e.g. state contracting boards), and 
quasi-autonomous boards (e.g. the Board of Regents); and how much should be reserved to the 
people themselves is a question which has occupied the thoughts of public servants since 
revolutionary times. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78: 
It is not otherwise to be supposed that the constitution could intend to enable the 
representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more 
rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the 
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
authority. 
  
 In the present instance, the people of the state of California have spoken through the 
most broadly based legislative instrument available -- the referendum. The federal judiciary has 
interposed its judgment to examine the initiative against the standard of the United States 
Constitution because, democratic or not, if the measure fails by that standard, it must fall. In 
Romer v. Evans, the state initiative did not pass muster. In this case, the court of appeals has 
given its assent. 
  
 I will go further than the court, however, in scrutinizing proposition 209, and I will do so 
through the lens of constituencies and the legitimacy of political action. How is the coalition 
against 209 constituted? What interests are represented by the Coalition for Economic Equity, et. 
al.? Is it enough to say that having the NAACP named as a plaintiff in this action implies that 
their position is supported by all, or even most, African Americans? 
 Conceivably, such a putatively broad based coalition could have collected enough votes 
from the non-white, non-male, majority of the electorate to defeat 209. 
 These questions are germane, not only to an examination of the electoral politics of 209, 
but also to crucial equal protection questions: 
1. Can it be shown that these plaintiffs represent the "women and minorities" they claim to 
represent? 
2. How were the affirmative action benefits which will be lost approved in the first place and by 
what authority or political process? 
3. Is there an equal protection problem with respect to the other "minorities and women" who 
are not included under the umbrella of these programs. 
Answer: 
1. See the discussion above. The answer is no. 
  
2. The regents of the University of California and the University administration was put into 
a state of confusion on its affirmative action policies with the advent of the supreme court 
decision in Regents v. Bakke. 
Since then, the university has tried to reorganize its admissions criteria while following the letter, 
if not the spirit of that decision. The letter of that decision stated that the Medical School at Davis 
could not use numerical quotas to raise its diversity statistics to given numerical levels. The spirit 
of the supreme court decision was to tell the University to go back to the drawing board and 
formulate a new policy which would not violate the equal protection guarantees to students like 
Alan Bakke. In the wake of that decision, the University instituted procedures to increase "under-
represented minorities", the graduate and professional schools wrote their own standards, the 
contracting agencies promulgated still another set of instructions. This patchwork mosaic of 
affirmative action protocols is triply suspect : 
 a. Because there has been no judicial finding of fact in any of these cases to justify a 
redistributive remedial action. 
 b. Because the executive and quasi-autonomous boards have not been demonstrated to 
have any legitimate constituency; and, 
  
  
 c. This answers question 3 above. The fact is that there is no agreement on which ethnic 
minorities are included in which protocol. Chinese are included in contracting awards, but not 
graduate school admissions(Chinese in fact have been denied admission to U.C. Berkeley when 
their representation went over 40%). South Asians are not included in any category I know of. 
 All of this raises serious equal protection concerns and the following paragraph forces us 
to interrogate our thinking. Professor Tribe gives such a complete and eloquent summary of the 
evidence I have been presenting that I beg your leave to quote it in its entirety. 
  
The Madisonian ideal of law as the expression of a general public good stands in sharp opposition 
to the pluralist notion that law aspires merely to satisfy the preferences of ad hoc interest 
groups. Whether or not judicially enforced, this ideal of law as rationally embodying a shared 
social vision may serve to broaden the perceived responsibilities of lawmakers and administrators 
in fulfilling their constitutional oaths. 
 The role of courts in reminding others of this ideal should not be underestimated. Even when 
judges stress the virtues of deference to choices made by the political branches--particularly in 
such spheres as zoning, taxation, and economic distribution or regulation --and even when they 
do not act in a spirit of suspicion that some illegitimate prejudice or other flaw has poisoned the 
political process by which the public interest, or the general good, has been defined, the very fact 
that judges continue to speak in the language of rationality, requiring some demonstration that 
the governments actions bear a discernible relationship to a defensible vision of the public good, 
reaffirms the possibility of a politics that transcends special interest deals and bargains, and of a 
polity that builds on civic virtue and public-spiritedness rather than one that wallows entirely in 
the exchange of private benefits and burdens.  
To the degree that the Constitution in general, and the fourteenth amendment in particular, 
embody efforts to transcend such factionalism and elevate public law above private interest, the 
judicial role in insisting upon rationality 
serves to reinforce a major constitutional aspiration. 
[emphasis added] 
  
 Of course, "special interest deals and bargains", like them or not , are a normal part of 
the political compromise which goes on everyday as 
the cost for enacting legislation in our system, and where such special deals are not legislatively 
enacted but are instead promulgated by the fiat of semi-autonomous boards and commissions, 
this delegation of power may be the reasonable cost of doing efficient government business. 
These special deals have often been forged behind closed doors at the state capital without 
public oversight or review and the beneficiaries may be anyone from military veterans to 
sanitation workers, but where the criterion of inclusion and exclusion is race, and in the absence 
of a judicial finding of systematic discrimination, and without a demonstrated compelling public 
purpose, the legislative or executive act must undergo close scrutiny indeed. 
 If individual enactments of affirmative action programs in cases like Croson and Adarand 
v. Pena must undergo such searching scrutiny, how much more should a patchwork collection of 
programs be required to undergo. Proposition 209 is simply the way the people of California have 
told the state agencies acting under their authority to conform to these equal protection 
requirements. Article 31 is not the injury which calls for remedial action. It is the remedy. 
  
  
 Remember, in the regulatory state, discrimination is never benign. 
All action is redistributive and what is a benefit to the winners is a denial to the losers. However, 
Professor Tribe is challenging us to go beyond a zero-sum solution which is rightly being 
dismantled as we speak, and to institute a system of true justice and equity which has the 
universality of Kants categorical imperative and the durability and legitimacy implied by the 
vision of a philosopher like John Rawls. 
Epilogue  
 Chief Justice John Marshall intimately understood the dialectic involved when organs of 
government act to the benefit or detriment of other agencies or the people as a whole. In his 
masterpiece of judicial reasoning and exegesis, McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall is examining the 
separation of powers issue raised when a state imposes a tax on a chartered bank of the national 
government, but the findings carry over by analogy to the present case. Remember that 
affirmative action "deals and bargains" 
(to use Professor Tribes very apt term) are a tax on everyone in the excluded classes who do not 
share in the benefits, and the question of what, if any, legitimate constituency is represented in 
these deals is one which is crucial to an equal protection analysis of the validity of proposition 
209. 
  
Chief Justice John Marshall: 
" The people of a state, therefore, give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their 
property, and as the exigencies [exigencies, not items of discretion] of government cannot be 
limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of 
the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard them 
against its abuse. But the means employed by the government of the Union have no such 
security, nor is the right of a state to tax them sustained by the same theory. Those means are 
not given by people of a particular state, not given by the constituents of the legislature[special 
interest lobbies], which claim the right to tax them, but for the people of all the states[the people 
of California as a whole]. They are given by all for the benefit of all--and upon theory, should be 
subjected to that government which belongs to all... 
 We find, then, on just theory, a total failure of this original right to tax the means employed by 
the government of the Union [i.e., the affirmative action tax imposed on the people of California 
as a whole]... The right never existed, and the question whether it has been surrendered cannot 
arise. 
[emphases added] 
   
  
  
   
   
  
Coda: Two Questions  
  
1. Is it an unconstitutional usurpation of political power for an outgoing White majority to 
enshrine a level playing field in an amendment to the California constitution before a new power 
bloc of groups claiming to represent the interests of "women and minorities" takes power? 
 The question is moot based on the figures from the Secretary of States office which 
indicates that white males are already in a minority of the electorate. If that were not the case, it 
would torture the meaning of equal protection to assert that it is unconstitutional to incorporate 
language into the California constitution which in relevant parts is almost identical to language in 
the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 Secondly, to answer a question which was indirectly posed by Professor Meisters 
assertion in our discussion on Romer v. Evans that there are conceivable instances where explicit 
race and gender based preferences could pass muster in particular localities in the absence of a 
judicial finding of systematic discrimination, i.e., as a matter of normal political administration, 
the results could only be characterized as bizarre. If such administrative judgments were to pass 
constitutional muster, one could envision a Balkan patchwork of municipalities all across the 
country each with its own peculiar system of preferences and discriminations established. Back to 
Jim Crow. 
  
2.  Does proposition 209 foreclose remedies that are available to other groups organized in 
the political process, for example, veterans, to sue for benefits and special preferences? 
 The set-asides granted by the people of California to veterans are a privilege which was 
granted through the political process. Similarly preferences and set-asides to selected minority 
groups have been established as a subsidy at the discretion of the State of California. Apart from 
judicially imposed remedies where there has been a judicial finding of fact indicating past 
discrimination, either of these subsidies can be withdrawn by the same political process which 
instituted them. If either group (and although I can clearly identify veterans I still cannot clearly 
delineate the "women and minorities" named in the court of appeals case) wishes to sue, on any 
theory including an expectation of entitlement to these preferences, it would have to justify its 
case in a court of law. It seems it would be especially difficult for the "Coalition" to establish that 
it is entitled to these preferences when so many deserving minorities are excluded for no reason 
other than the fact that they are not effectively organized. Veterans (including all races) could at 
least claim that they have given substantial service to the country. 
  
 Of the over 9 million voters in the election: 8% African American, 22% Latino, 26% Asian Pacific 
Islander, 44% Caucasian and other. Source: Secretary of State, State of California. 
 Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law(1988) p. 1521. See Local 28 v. EEOC, U.S. v. 
Paradise,  
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg. 
 Let us recall here that the Courts deference to redistributive legislation is conditioned upon its 
perception of the relative access or participation of the parties in the redistribution. Williamson v. 
Lee Optical. 
 Also that the public purpose to be served is to be taken into account in the examination of the 
action Miller v. Schoene. 
 But that where the law relies on an explicitly racial criterion, a compelling public purpose must 
be served. Korematsu v. United States.  
Further note, The Supreme Court in Bakke did not find that the compelling public purpose 
claimed by the state of California to provide more practicing medical doctors to poor communities 
was not served by admitting more minority applicants to the medical school at Davis. 
Tribe, ibid., p. 1451  
The standard was set in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. where the court held that "the 
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those 
burdened or benefited by a particular classification.", and that, according to Professor OBrien, 
the single standard of review for racial classifications should be "strict scrutiny."  
The Court continues this analysis in Adarand Constructors v. Pena 
  
  The Court established, in cases through Croson, a three-pronged test of review for such 
 "compensatory" legislation which includes: 
  1. Skepticism: "any preference based or racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive 
a most  searching examination." 
  2. Consistency: "the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not 
dependent on  the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." 
  3. Congruence: "equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as 
that  under the Fourteenth Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo 
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)  
It is established that the state may subsidize certain activities which it wishes to promote. 
Woolsey v. Maynard, Maher v. Roe.  
But where fundamental rights are infringed , the state is constrained and the examination of 
whether the act under question is a carrot or a stick os closely scrutinized. Sherbert v. Verner. 
Although it has been long established that equal access to state graduate and professional 
schools, etc., is a right( Sweatt v. Painter ), it hasnt at all been established that preferential 
admission to such schools, in the absence of a judicial finding of past discrimination, is a right, 
and that a denial of such is an unconstitutional infringement of a fundamental right.  
